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BACKGROUND: Patients in intensive care units (ICUs)
frequently experience adverse drug events involving
intravenous medications (IV-ADEs), which are often
preventable.
OBJECTIVES: To determine how frequently preventable
IV-ADEs in ICUs match the safety features of a pro-
grammable infusion pump with safety software (“smart
pump”) and to suggest potential improvements in
smart-pump design.
DESIGN: Using retrospective medical-record review,
we examined preventable IV-ADEs in ICUs before and
after 2 hospitals replaced conventional pumps with
smart pumps. The smart pumps alerted users when
programmed to deliver duplicate infusions or continuous-
infusion doses outside hospital-defined ranges.
PARTICIPANTS: 4,604 critically ill adults at 1 academic
and 1 nonacademic hospital.
MEASUREMENTS: Preventable IV-ADEs matching
smart-pump features and errors involved in prevent-
able IV-ADEs.
RESULTS: Of 100 preventable IV-ADEs identified, 4
involved errors matching smart-pump features. Two
occurred before and 2 after smart-pump implementa-
tion. Overall, 29% of preventable IV-ADEs involved
overdoses; 37%, failures to monitor for potential prob-
lems; and 45%, failures to intervene when problems
appeared. Error descriptions suggested that expanding
smart pumps’ capabilities might enable them to prevent
more IV-ADEs.
CONCLUSION: The smart pumps we evaluated are
unlikely to reduce preventable IV-ADEs in ICUs because
they address only 4% of them. Expanding smart-pump
capabilities might prevent more IV-ADEs.
KEY WORDS: drug therapy; medication error; prevention and control;
infusion pump; decision making, computer-assisted; critical care.
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INTRODUCTION
Preventable adverse drug events involving intravenous medi-
cations (preventable IV-ADEs: injuries owing to intravenous
medication errors) occur frequently in intensive care units
(ICUs).
1,2 Many errors occur during medication administra-
tion, and calculating infusion rates and programming pumps
are high-risk steps.
2,3 Programmable infusion pumps with
safety software (“smart pumps”) were designed to intercept
such errors by displaying alerts if continuous-infusion dosages
exceed hospital-defined ranges or, for one pump, if duplicate
infusions are administered.
4
Three studies indicate that the reprogramming of smart
pumps in response to alerts occurs frequently.
5–7 However,
because most medication errors happen not to cause harm,
2,8
the ability of smart pumps to reduce IV-ADEs also warrants
investigation. One study evaluated whether smart pumps
prevent IV-ADEs and found no significant decrease.
8 No
studies have assessed how often preventable IV-ADEs actually
match smart-pump safety features or whether expanding
pump capabilities might prevent additional types of IV-ADEs.
In this study, we sought to determine how frequently
preventable IV-ADEs match one smart pump’s features and
to identify additional smart-pump capabilities. Our ultimate
objective was to compare preventable IV-ADE incidence rates
between smart pumps and conventional pumps.
METHODS
Overview
We used quantitative and qualitative methods to examine
preventable IV-ADEs in adult ICUs before and after 2 hospitals
replaced conventional pumps with smart pumps.
Setting and Subjects
With assistance from the study sponsor (Cardinal Health, San
Diego, CA, USA), we selected 2 hospitals that had implemented
their smart pumps in 2003 (Alaris version 5): an academic
hospital in the northeast and a nonacademic hospital in the
west. We examined 20,000 bed-days of care in surgical,
41trauma/burn, and medical ICUs, half during conventional-
pump study periods and half during smart-pump periods. We
obtained Institutional Review Board approvals; informed con-
sent was not required.
Smart-Pump Features
A programmable unit within the pump controlled up to 4
attached infusion devices and recorded (“logged”) program-
ming errors, alerts, reprogramming events, and overrides.
Before implementation, study hospitals developed software
libraries for drugs given by continuous infusion; bolus dosing
was not addressed. The manufacturer suggested dosing limits
then hospitals made modifications. ICU libraries included over
50 drugs.
Nurses could program the pumps as if they were conven-
tional or use the library’s safety features. Once in the library,
nurses selected a drug and standard concentration then
entered the dose. For weight-based dosing, nurses entered
patient weights and doses, then the software calculated flow
rates. When doses exceeded library limits or duplicate infusions
were programmed, the software provided alerts and prevented
infusion until they were addressed; overrides were permitted.
Data Collection
This included abstracting medical records and rating sus-
pected ADEs. We did not observe pump use or abstract smart-
pump logs.
Critical care nurses (4–5 per hospital; uninvolved in study
participants’ care) received 4-day trainings in medical-record
abstractionandADEidentification(readingmanuals,discussing
examples,andreviewingsamplerecords).Duringdatacollection,
nurses recorded clinical and demographic data then used
manual trigger-tool review (which uses key words as sentinels
to identify ADEs)
9 plus implicit review (professional judgment) to
identify suspected ADEs and any events that infusion pumps
might have caused. For each suspected ADE, they summarized
relevant details of medication therapy,
10 errors, and injuries.
Reliability assessment involved reabstracting 100 records.
Four board-certified Internal Medicine physicians (unaffili-
ated with study hospitals) rated suspected ADEs. Two reviewed
each electronic summary individually then met to reach
consensus, rating: whether an ADE occurred,
2 drugs involved,
routes/modes of administration,
2 preventability,
11 errors in-
volved,
2 and whether errors matched smart-pump functions at
each hospital (i.e., whether continuous-infusion doses were
outside library limits or present in multiple infusions). Reliabil-
ityassessment involvedrandomly selecting 50 suspected ADEs.
Quantitative Analysis
We used SAS version 9.1.3. First, we examined administration
routes/modes, drugs, stages in delivery, and errors involved in
preventable IV-ADEs overall. Second, we calculated incidence
rates (preventable IV-ADEs per 1,000 patient-days in ICU) for
preventable IV-ADEs matching smart-pump functions in each
study period. Third, we compared total preventable IV-ADEs
incidence rates between conventional-pump and smart-pump
periods using Poisson regression models that included multi-
ple demographic and clinical variables. We had 80% power
(alpha=0.05) to detect a 46% change. Finally, we determined
intracluster correlations for nurse and physician ratings.
12
Qualitative Analysis
For events matching smart-pump features, we summarized
errors involved. For other events, we summarized examples of
commonerrorsand explored additional smart-pumpcapabilities.
RESULTS
Among 4,604 patients with 20,559 bed-days in ICU, we
identified 100 preventable IV-ADEs (4.86 per 1,000 patient-
days). Half of preventable IV-ADEs involved continuous infu-
sions and 40% boluses. Morphine, insulin, fentanyl, and
propofol represented 44% of all drugs involved. Half of errors
occurred during ordering, 14% during administration, and 35%
during monitoring. Failure to intervene, failure to monitor (37%
combining subtypes, not shown), and overdose were common
errors (Table 1). Two preventable IV-ADEs in each study period
(4%, 0.19 per 1,000 patient-days) matched smart-pump func-
tions at each hospital (Table 2). No pumps caused any injuries.
As noted in the Introduction, our ultimate objective was to
compare total preventable IV-ADEs incidence rates between
conventional-pump and smart-pump periods. However, given
that few preventable IV-ADEs matched smart-pump features,
statistical power was severely inadequate. The conventional-
pump rate was 4.78 per 1,000 patient-days and the smart-
pump rate was 4.95 (adjusted mean difference 0.04 per 1,000
patient-days, p=0.96).
Event descriptions suggested that expanding smart-pump
library applications, integrating pumps with vital-sign and
laboratory data, integrating pumps with computerized physi-
cian order entry (CPOE), and automating medication titration
Table 1. Types of IV Medication Errors Causing Preventable IV-
ADEs in Both Study Periods Combined
Errors
Errors relating to dose of medication received
Improper dose: overdose, no. (%) 29 (29.0%)
Improper dose: underdose, no. (%) 3 (3.0%)
Improper dose: extra dose, no. (%) 0 (0.0%)
Wrong strength/concentration: too high, no. (%) 1 (1.0%)
Wrong rate, no. (%) 1 (1.0%)
Wrong duration, no. (%) 4 (4.0%)
Errors relating to administration details
Wrong technique, no. (%) 5 (5.0%)
Wrong drug, no. (%) 5 (5.0%)
Wrong time, no. (%) 1 (1.0%)
Errors relating to monitoring for potential problems
Failure to monitor: drug–disease interaction, no. (%) 5 (5.0%)
Failure to monitor: allergy, no. (%) 3 (3.0%)
Failure to monitor: drug–drug interaction, no. (%) 1 (1.0%)
Failure to monitor: laboratory, no. (%) 9 (9.0%)
Failure to monitor: other, no. (%) 19 (19.0%)
Errors relating to intervening after problems appear
Failure to intervene, no. (%) 45 (45.0%)
Other errors 13 (13.0%)
Total preventable IV-ADEs* 100
*Each preventable IV-ADE may be associated with more than 1 type of
error.
IV-ADE = adverse drug events involving intravenous medications
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IV-ADE Description Description of Smart-pump Features
Preventable IV-ADEs matching existing smart-pump functions at the same hospital and existing smart-pump functions
Overdose: A middle-aged female with a stroke was prescribed an IV
labetalol infusion for blood pressure control. Pharmacy sent 2
medication bags to the unit, 1 containing 1 mg/mL labetalol and, 2 h later,
another containing 2 mg/mL. The 1-mg/mL solution infused at 100 mg/h
and the 2 mg/mL solution infused concurrently in a second line at 140 mg/h.
The blood pressure fell to 85/70 then the second infusion was stopped and the
blood pressure recovered.
Practice standardization: After smart pumps implementation, 1 mg/mL
was the only concentration of labetalol used in ICUs at this hospital.
Overdose detection: Smart pumps at this hospital alerted nurses when
labetalol infused at a dose above 120 mg/h.
Duplicate medication detection: Smart pumps at this hospital alerted
nurses when labetalol was administered concurrently in 2 different lines.
Overdose: A middle-aged male with delerium tremens received a
lorazepam infusion at 20 mg/h and subsequently an IV propofol
infusion at 70 mcg/kg/min. His blood pressure and oxygen saturation
declined, the 2 medications were titrated off over the next hour and a
half, and then the blood pressure recovered.
Overdose detection: Smart pumps at this hospital alerted nurses when
lorazepam infused at a dose above 10 mg/h (or propofol at a dose above
100 mcg/kg/min).
Overdose: A middle-aged male with renal failure received increasing
doses of an insulin infusion for uncontrolled blood glucose (per
protocol), peaking at 24 units/h for blood glucose values in the 400s.
Over the next 6 h, the blood glucose declined and the insulin was
titrated off, but the blood glucose dropped into the 20s.
Overdose detection: Smart pumps at this hospital alerted nurses when
insulin infused at a dose above than 20 units/h.
Overdose: A young adult male received a propofol infusion for ventilator
sedation. It was started at 70 mcg/kg/min and increased to 100 mcg/kg/min
10 min later. His blood pressure fell to 70/50, and then recovered after the
propofol was stopped.
Overdose detection: Smart pumps at this hospital alerted nurses when
propofol infused at a dose above 80 mcg/kg/min.
Examples of common preventable IV-ADEs and expanding pump library capabilities to prevent additional IV-ADEs
Failure to intervene: A middle-aged female on morphine PCA pump for
postoperative pain experienced 3 episodes of vomiting. She received 3
doses of ondansetron and 1 of promethazine. After 24 h, the opiate was
changed to hydromorphone and the vomiting stopped.
Modificationstointercepterrors:ForpatientsonIVopiates,a smartpump
coulddetectwhenIVantiemeticsaregivenandalertnursesthatswitching
opiates should be considered.
Overdose: An elderly female with a stroke and a systolic blood pressure in
190s received 2 doses of IV hydralazine 20 mg 5 min apart. She developed
hypotension and a severe brain stem infarct.
Modifications to intercept errors: For patients on IV hydralazine, a smart
pump could track cumulative doses, have limits per designated period of
time, and alert nurses if doses exceeded these limits.
Examples of common preventable IV-ADEs and incorporating real-time vital-sign or laboratory test data to prevent additional IV-ADEs
Overdose, failure to monitor, failure to intervene: An elderly male was
given 100 mcg IV fentanyl bolus and propofol infusion at 35 mcg/kg/min
for a bedside procedure. Blood pressure dropped to 60s systolic. He
received 250 mL of normal saline, but propofol was not changed. Blood
pressure was rechecked 90 min later and was still in 60s systolic.
Modifications to intercept errors: For patients on propofol or other
vasoactive IV drugs, a smart pump could receive blood pressure data,
and alert nurses or shut off when blood pressure remains outside a
defined range for more than a few minutes.
Modifications to automate tasks: For patients on propofol or other
vasoactive IV drugs, a smart pump could receive blood pressure data and
titrate the drugs to keep blood pressure within a defined range.
Failure to monitor, failure to intervene: An elderly female was started on
an IV heparin infusion for acute myocardial infarction. Daily PTT results
were repeatedly above therapeutic range. Dose was lowered but
PTT was not repeated until the next day when it was still high. Patient
developed a retroperitoneal hematoma and died.
Modifications to intercept errors: For patients on IV heparin, a smart
pump could receive PTT data and alert nurses if PTT were not checked
according to the frequency defined in the protocol or if PTTwere above or
below desired range.
Modifications to automate tasks: For patients on IV heparin, a smart
pump could receive PTT data and titrate heparin according to a defined
protocol. A smart pump could interact with computerized physician
order entry, which could order PTT to be checked according to the
frequency defined in the protocol.
Failure to monitor: An elderly female with end-stage renal failure was a
given standard insulin infusion protocol to manage her blood glucose
but no glucose was provided via the enteral route or IV. Her blood glucose
dropped to 33 then rebounded to over 200 after glucose was given.
Modifications to intercept errors: For patients on IVinsulin, smart pumps
could receive blood glucose data, alert nurses when values fall outside of
a protocol, check whether protocols are appropriate for renal function,
and alert nurses if no IV glucose is provided.
Modifications to automate tasks: For patients on IV insulin, a smart pump
could receive blood glucose data and titrate insulin according to a defined
protocol.
IV-ADE = adverse drug events involving intravenous medications, PTT = partial thromboplastin time
43 Nuckols et al.: Smart-Pumps and ADEs JGIMmight prevent additional IV-ADEs (Table 2). The intracluster
correlation for nurses identifying suspected events was 0.39.
Physician intracluster correlations were: for ADEs, 0.71;
preventability, 0.90; and smart-pump preventability, 1.0.
DISCUSSION
Examining preventable IV-ADEs among 4,600 adult ICU
patients, we found that only 4% could be intercepted by a
smart pump that detects duplicate and excessive doses of
continuous infusions. There were several reasons for the low
rate of corresponding events: these pumps did not address
boluses, the dosing ranges appeared too wide for certain
patients, and monitoring problems were more common than
administration ones. Nevertheless, we observed that expand-
ing pump functions and integrating them with real-time
clinical data might enable smart-pump technology to reduce
other common, harmful errors.
Four evaluations of similar smart pumps came to more
positive conclusions. Comparing 426 infused medications with
physician orders during a 9-hour period, researchers judged 1
error to be smart-pump-preventable because it was a rate-
deviation error involving a pump-programming mistake.
13
Three studies examining smart-pump logs found that repro-
gramming events, assumed to be intercepted errors, were
common.
5–7
Because errors have unpredictable relationships to injuries,
however, preventable IV-ADEs must also be examined; for
example, 0.9% of medication errors caused ADEs in medical
floor units versus 11% in cardiac ICUs.
2,8 A controlled trial
evaluating a similar pump did consider preventable ADEs and
found no significant reduction, because of limited power and
because nurses used its safety features inconsistently.
8
In contrast, our analysis revealed that substantially reduc-
ing preventable IV-ADEs in ICUs would require smarter
pumps. Many preventable IV-ADEs involved failures to moni-
tor for or adequately respond to undesirable medication
effects. Smart-pump technology could alert nurses to such
failures by integrating infusions with CPOE, and real-time
vital-sign and laboratory data. Perhaps more controversially,
smart pumps could automate some titration tasks. Intensive
insulin infusions seem particularly amenable to automation
because complex protocols create many opportunities for
error; clinical assessment is rarely required; and an automated
technique for tightly controlling blood glucose, the euglycemic
glucose clamp, already exists.
14 Others have described closed-
loop systems for titrating sedatives.
15
The manufacturer of the pumps we evaluated has already
expanded applications to include boluses, syringe pumps, and
patient-controlled analgesia. An integrated bar-code reader
has been designed to address wrong-patient and wrong-drug
errors. A patient-controlled analgesia pump monitors oxygen
saturation and end-tidal carbon dioxide, issuing an alert or
shutting off if values deviate from hospital-defined ranges
(Butterfield, personal communication, 2006).
As with any technology, new smart-pump capabilities have
potential barriers to overcome. Integration with bar coding and
CPOE assumes that hospitals are adopting these technologies,
which may not be the case.
16 Incorporating real-time vital-sign
data may require nursing practice changes. Integration with
laboratory data would require software development. Auto-
mating monitoring and titration tasks would reduce nurses’
opportunities to practice these skills.
17 Finally, new safety
technologies can introduce new errors.
18 Consequently,
expanding smart-pump applications will require careful devel-
opment and testing.
Regarding limitations, we may have underestimated events
matching smart-pump functions because we could not evaluate
smart-pump logs or observe users. Nursing agreement was only
fair, possibly owing to insufficient training or reabstracting too
few records; other studies have not reported nurse agreement.
However,weusedstandardmethodsanddocumentedphysician
agreement comparable to prior studies.
19 We studied 2 hospi-
tals, 1 clinical setting, and 1 time period. Smart-pump technol-
ogy is evolving rapidly and future research should include non-
ICU settings, where IV-ADEs may not be detected quickly.
CONCLUSIONS
The smart pumps we evaluated are unlikely to reduce
preventable IV-ADEs in ICUs because they address only 4%
of them. Expanding smart-pump capabilities might prevent
more IV-ADEs.
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